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Summary
Unity in diversity: the decentralised application of article 8l EC
Council Regulation 1/2003 marks the dawn of a new era in the field of EC
Competition law. From May 1, 2004, national courts and national
competition authorities will share the Commission's power to apply art. 8l
EC as a whole, including the third paragraph, which from then on
consequently will have direct effect. Relinquishing its long-kept monopoly
on the granting of exemptions, the Commission has in the process also
proposed, that agreements which are incompatible with art. 81(l) EC, and
have hitherto been viewed as void until exempted, will instead be valid ab
initio and remain so unless declared otherwise. Since that proposal has been
adopted by the Council in the new Regulation, that replaces the venerable
"Regulation 17" which dated from 1962, the application of a system of
legal exception will be compulsory when using art. 8l EC.
Both of these elements: empowering national competition authorities, and
doing away with automatic nullity, constituting in Ehlermann's phrase a
'legal and cultural revolution', have raised more than a few eyebrows in
academic literature. This book endeavours to answer some of the questions
raised as to the compatibility of this revolution with current Community law.
The first question pertains to the compatibility of Regulation 1/2003 with the
wording of art. 81 EC. Additionally, the feasibility of giving direct effecr Ío


































art. 8l EC, the issue revolves around the question ofthe basis ofthe current
exemption system. If it is based on art. 81 EC, a system of legal exception
cannot be introduced without conflicting with the wording of that provision.
However, it is concluded that the current system is actually based on
Regulation 17 alone, with the Treaty itself containing no definitive
preference. Therefore, changing that system via a new Regulation, replacing
the old, is possible without diverging from the Treaty text. In addition, the
Court has in the past applied a technique not unlike the approach of the new
system of legal exception, thus making way for the argument that with
regard to this element, changing tack is less controversial than it seems.
Finally, art. 81(3) EC is found to be perfectly capable ofhaving direct effect,
inespective of the choice between the classic van Gend en Loos criteria and
the test of justiciability.
The Íburth chapter looks at the only seemingly simple doctrine of
supremacy. As supremacy has a somewhat different Íunction in competition
law than in other areas of Community law, the doctrine ditfers accordingly
by having both normative and purely procedural elements. In the past
multiple theories regarding the relationship between national and
Community competition law have been developed: e.g. the
Einschrnnkentheorie (single barrier theory) and the Zweischrankentheorie
(double barrier theory), the latter also in various forms. At the end of the day
they all share the same defect, consisting of an interpretation of the Walt
Wilhelm judgment as if it were a doctrinal focal point, instead of merely
being a practical solution for the problem at that time. The first draft of the
new Regulation sought to diverge from the rule of Wah Wilhelm in a way














supremacy to be overhauled. As both walz' view and that draft cannot be
matched to the current structure of supremacy, Regulation l/2003 only
passes the compatibility test because of fundamental changes made later on
in the legislative procedure prior to agreement on the final text. In the end,
the combined action of normative and procedural elements ensure that
Regulation 1/2003 stays well within the boundaries set by the seminal walr
Wilhelm judgment and the resulting principle of supremacy of Communiry
competition law over its national counterpart.
The next chapter looks at subsidiarity, a principle rooted in western
philosophy but only introduced into Community Law as a result of the
Maastricht Treaty. As this principle seeks to determine when the community
is authorized to act as opposed to the Member state, it apparently performs
the role of attributing powers once again, as Community law has (through
the case-law of the Court of Justice) had such a mechanism for attributing
powers from the start. In addition to this apparent oddity, the principle is
worded sufïciently vaguely in art. 5 EC for it to be used for almost any
viewpoint regarding the authority of the Community to act. Firstly, it is
concluded that subsidiarity has no meaning for Community law before
Maastricht. Secondly, that for a useful interpretation of art. 5 EC, one has to
look elsewhere.
An obvious starting point for such a venture is the Protocol on subsidiarity,
which however fails to shed new light on the Treaty article, with the
exception of introducing an element of weighing the interests of the
Community against those of the Member States. In this book, two origins of
the subsidiarity principle are studied: initially the papal encyclical
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Quadrctgesimo Anno, thereafter the economic theories concerning the
weighing of interests. Where the encyclical does not produce a sufficiently
detailed criterion to be of any help with regard to the interpretation of art. 5
EC, the economio theory on the so called prisoner's dilemma on the other
hand succeeds. Via the anchor point found in the Protocol, the resulting
economic model is introduced into art. 5 EC. This leads to the conclusion
that the application of art. 8l EC should in principle be left to Member
States, with the Commission stepping in only if such action represents a
surplus value. Such surplus value may lie in the need of a consistent and
unitbrm application of the Treaty article or where national authorities are,
due to their lack of oversight, simply not suitable fora for the task at hand.
The economic model also makes it evident that Member States, now playing
a greater role in applying art. 8l EC, may only do so when their new found
freedom to act is embedded in a hierarchical structure in which the
Commission acts as supervisor. In acting as such, the Commission must let
go of the abstract goal of ensuring complete uniformity in the application of
art. 81 EC, as it is neither attainable nor desirable. The decentralised
application of art. 81 EC is thus best characterised as unity in diversity.
Regulation ll2003 does not strictly adhere to this model. Compliance with
the subsidiarity principle may however be accomplished by an interpretation
of the final text of the Regulation, that is slightly altered in comparison with
the interpretation given by the Commission. Hence, the Regulation once
again succeeds in staying within the limits of cuÍrent law, if only because it
is possible to interpret Regulation 112003 in such a way as to remove the
general authority to apply art. 81 EC as still envisaged by the Commission.
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The final chapter is, like ancient Gaul, divided into three parts. An attempr is
made to extrapolate the likely view of the Court on the cunent
modernisation from the result of its judgmenÍs in Masterfoods and Spanish
Banks , although Regulation 112003 did not exist at that time. Whereas in the
Íïrst judgment the Court may be seen to subscribe to the viewpoint that for a
successful decentralisation of the application of art. 8l EC it is necessary t0
have national judges bound by Commission Decisions, thus paving the way
for Regulation 112003, the judgment in Spanish Banks may, according t0
some, at best prove to be a sword of Damocles still dangling from above.
However, in the light of the new role of national competition authorities in
Regulation 112003, it may be wondered whether the controversy, instead of
being seen as Damocles' sword, should not be treated more like Macbeth's
dagger, i.e. questioned ifit is really there.
The conclusion of this book is that apart from an interpretation issue with
regard to the Commission's general authority to apply art. 81 EC, Regulation
112003 is wholly compatible with current Community law so that possible
future scrutiny by the Court is not to be feared.
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